“THE LYING PEN OF THE Scribes”:
OF HOLY BOOKS AND PIOUS FRAUDS

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“Fraud” is not a term commonly used in religious studies. It does not appear in The Encyclopedia of Religion (Eliade 1987); it is absent from Critical Terms for Religious Studies (Taylor 1998); it cannot be found even among the 3,200 articles in The HarperCollins Dictionary of Religion (Smith 1995). The absence of “fraud” from the disciplinary lexica is more than a little curious, especially since “fraud” is very much a part of religion’s vocabulary, and, from a cynical view of religion’s history, “fraud” might very well be regarded as the modus operandi religiosus. How is it that, within the history of religion, “fraud” can be an instrument of legitimation under one set of circumstances and an altogether illegitimate act under another? The article engages this question through an analysis and redescription of the phenomenon of the “holy book” in Mediterranean antiquity.

One is never simpleminded enough about the condemnation of forgeries. Pious frauds are frauds, for which one must show no piety—and no pity. (Momigliano 1987: 7)

This just in …

Tomorrow on the Fox News Channel you hear the following story: Unnamed sources reveal that President George W. Bush will announce today that Chief Justice William Reinquisit has just made an astonishing discovery. In an unused storage closet of the Supreme Court building in Washington, D.C., Justice Reinquisit has found a previously unknown document that purports to be the lost second page of the Constitution of the United States. The signatures of Madison, Hamilton, and the other members of the Constitutional Convention affixed to the document have reportedly been authenticated by Joseph Ellis, a well-known scholar of early American history and, coincidentally, a relative of Karl Rove, White House chief adviser. The same sources are reporting that the newly restored Constitution stipulates that the United States is a Christian nation, mandates prayer in public schools, prohibits a woman’s right to an
abortion, and states unequivocally that lying under oath rises to the level of an impeachable offense. Other passages reportedly contain language outlawing the Democratic party, virtually guaranteeing Mr. Bush another term in office. The same sources are also reporting what may be the most astonishing discovery of all. It appears that the Founding Fathers decided that only descendants of one Thaddeus Reinquist, a rural Pennsylvania turnip farmer and slave holder who died in 1794, are qualified to be Supreme Court justices. By another remarkable coincidence, Chief Justice Reinquist and Justice Clarence Thomas are both direct descendants. The other justices will be asked to submit their resignations by noon tomorrow.

Would you believe a single word of this report if you heard it? Before you answer that question, consider the following biblical account from 2 Kings 22-23.

"I have found the Book of the Law in the House of Yahweh"

Near the end of the seventh century B.C.E., a young prince named Josiah, just eight years old but allegedly a direct descendant of King David, ascended to the throne of Judah after his father’s assassination. During a renovation of the temple in the eighteenth year of his reign (621 B.C.E.), a document was discovered that provided the authorization for a sweeping religious and political reformation of the little temple-state of Judah. Called the “Book of the Law” (sepher hattôra), it had been entirely forgotten prior to its discovery by Hilkiah the chief priest, and it revealed—shockingly—that the traditional practices of the cult of Yahweh, the local god of Jerusalem, had been wrong. After the book’s authenticity was established by a court prophet, Josiah set about correcting these wrongs in obedience to the stipulations contained in the book. As part of this risorgimento, Josiah ordered a thorough “purification” of the cult, abolishing from the temple and throughout his little kingdom all deviant forms of religion. The purge even extended northward into parts of the old Northern Kingdom—“Israel”—for the book also seems to have sanctioned territorial conquest and even the “cleansing” of the territory’s inhabitants. Under Josiah’s direction, the reformers declared the now purified temple as the only legitimate religious institution and Yahweh of Jerusalem the only deity whose worship would be permitted. After centuries of wrongdoing, a righteous king had finally arisen
to correct the errors of the past, settle old scores, and lead the people to redemption. All of Josiah’s actions, it was claimed, were sanctioned by, and carried out in accordance with, “the words of the law that were written in the book that Hilkiah had found in the house of Yahweh” (2 Kings 23:24).1

Would you believe a single word of this report? Apparently, some of Josiah’s subjects bought it hook, line, and sinker, but we will never know with certainty just how many of them accepted the authenticity of the “Book of the Law” and the story of its discovery. Within a few years Josiah was felled by an Egyptian arrow at Megiddo (609 B.C.E.), and his reforms died with him. Then, about two decades later, Jerusalem was sacked by the armies of Nebuchadrezzar (587/86 B.C.E.). But the “Book of the Law” and the story of its discovery have succeeded in ways Josiah never would have imagined. Not only are they now part of the collections of canonical texts sacred to Judaism and Christianity, their “authenticity” has found a ready audience among many biblical scholars. In one of the most widely read and influential books published on the Bible in the last several decades, Richard Elliott Friedman identifies the prophet Jeremiah as the author behind the account of the discovery of the “Book of the Law” in 2 Kings 22-23 (part of the so-called “Deuteronomic History”), and declares that Jeremiah “was no fraud, pious or otherwise” (Friedman 1987: 149). On the contrary, Friedman assures the reader that Jeremiah “built his history around the Deuteronomic law code [alleged to be the “Book of the Law” discovered in the temple], which was an authentically old document, and which he [Jeremiah] may well have believed to be by Moses himself” (Friedman 1987: 149, emphasis added). Friedman goes on to say that Jeremiah “used other documents as well, and he fashioned a continuous history out of them. His own additions gave it [the Deuteronomic History] structure, continuity, and meaning. … There need not be anything fraudulent in any of this. Quite the contrary. It rather appears to be a sincere attempt, by a sensitive and skillful man, to tell his people’s history” (Friedman 1987: 149, emphasis added).

The suspicious reader may wonder whether our biblical scholar

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1 There are, in fact, two versions of this discovery tale (2 Kings 22-23 and 2 Chronicles 34); they are, however, irreconcilably contradictory. For a discussion and analysis of the critical questions, see e.g. Eissfeldt 1965: 171-176; Miller and Hayes 1986: 388-402; and Ahlström 1993: 770-781.
protests too much. What, exactly, does he mean by “authentically old”? How does he know that Jeremiah believed the book was written “by Moses himself”? Friedman’s choice of words (“building”, “fashioning”, “additions”, “skill”) indicates just how fine the line can be between discovery and invention, history and fiction, religion and politics—in sum, between legitimacy and illegitimacy. His adamant denial of “fraud, pious or otherwise” is framed as a direct response to the famous 1805 dissertation of Wilhelm Martin Leberecht de Wette (1780-1849), one of the founding fathers of modern biblical criticism, and one of the first to argue that the scroll Hilkiah found in the temple was none other than the book of Deuteronomy. Friedman writes: “De Wette concluded that the book of Deuteronomy was not a long-lost document, but rather was written not long before its ‘discovery’ by Hilkiah. Though it may have been written for legitimate purposes, it was nevertheless falsely attributed to Moses. De Wette referred to it as a ‘pious fraud.’ ‘Pious fraud’ is strong language to use about a part of the Bible” (Friedman 1987: 102). Strong language, indeed, for it would appear to be a coup de bâton from which biblical scholars are still recovering two centuries later—if, that is, de Wette ever uttered the words “pious fraud” in the first place.

Who called the “Book of the Law” a “pious fraud”?

De Wette’s 1805 dissertation began with the pronouncement—certainly daring and radical for its time—“Pentateuchum non esse a Mose conscriptum”, and then went on to suggest that the scroll “discovered” in the temple might have been the biblical book of Deuteronomy, or a document on which Deuteronomy was based: “illum enim codicem legum ab Hilkia sacerdote inventum (2 Reg. XXII) Deuteronomium nostrum fuisse haud improbabile coniectura assequi licet” (1830: 151, 164-165 n. 5).² Then, in

² “One may conjecture that it is not at all improbable that the Book of Laws discovered by Hilkiah the priest (2 Kings 22) was our Deuteronomy.” I cite from the reprint of de Wette’s dissertation in his Opuscula theologica (Berlin: Georg Reimer, 1830), pp. 151-168, the title of which is: Dissertatio critica qua a prioribus Deuteronomium pentateuchi libris diversum, alius cuissdam recentioris auctoris opus esse monstratur. The title of the 1805 dissertation (Jena) is slightly different: Dissertatio critico-exegetica qua Deuteronomium a prioribus pentateuchi libris diversum, etc. That Deuteronomy was the book “found” by Hilkiah had been suggested already by Jerome and a few others in antiquity, as well as by Hobbes and Lessing in the modern period (see Smend 1957: 32-36; Paul 1985: 9-12).
the first volume of his *Beiträge zur Einleitung in das Alte Testament*, published in the following year (1806), de Wette discussed again, and this time with much greater power and precision, the mysterious Gesetzbuch discovered in the temple. Among other things, he noted that the reforms it spawned were innovative in comparison with all other pentateuchal laws but consistent with the commandments prescribed only in the book of Deuteronomy. In all likelihood, he concluded, the "Book of the Law" was a version of what later came to be Deuteronomy (de Wette 1806-1807: 1.168-179). Not only was Deuteronomy not written by Moses (*pace* Deut. 31:9), it was not even very old. How it was placed in the temple was left open to speculation by de Wette. He did not rule out the possibility that it might have been planted by Hilkiah, the chief priest. Yet—and this is crucial—de Wette refused to pursue the matter any further. "We cannot know," he wrote,

when and how this book came into the temple. Of course, it is possible that the priest Hilkiah had planted it. This opinion certainly has much at present to be said for itself: the whole manner in which the book is introduced resembles a contrived affair in which, besides Hilkiah, Shaphan in particular and the prophetess Huldah could have had a part. Still, I am far from willing to elevate this conjecture to certainty. Indeed, by doing so, I would overstep the laws of history. Wherever the book may have come from, history has drawn a curtain over it, and it would be a mistake to wish to draw the curtain back. (de Wette 1806-1807: 1.179)

De Wette’s identification of the “Book of the Law” with Deuteronomy remains to this day the generally accepted view among biblical scholars, even if they differ on the question of whether it was identical with the biblical Deuteronomy or whether, as most contend, it was an earlier edition of it (Sweeney 2001: 137-169). Moreover, de Wette’s thesis provided biblical scholars with the Archimedean point by which the other component parts of the Pentateuch could also be determined and dated. This was done in a series of studies, beginning in 1834, by Édouard Reuss, Karl Heinrich Graf, and Abraham Kuenen (to mention no more), culminating in 1878 with the appearance of Julius Wellhausen’s *Geschichte Israels I*, published from the second edition of 1883 onwards under the title *Prolegomena zur Geschichte Israels* (see Rogerson 1984: 257-272). The existence of different sources in the Pentateuch had been postulated since Jean Astruc in 1753, but no clue for the dates of these compositions had been
found. It was de Wette’s *Dissertatio* and subsequent *Beiträge* that now supplied the clue.

I have no stake here in either defending or rejecting de Wette and his epigones. Simply put, my “outsider’s” view is that the “Book of the Law” was neither part of Deuteronomy nor any other known book (for reasons enumerated by Ahlström 1993: 775-777). Indeed, I have my doubts about the historicity of the discovery tale itself in 2 Kings 22 (see e.g. Mayes 1978; Diebner and Nauert 1984). My interest, rather, is in de Wette’s *alleged* characterization of the discovery of the “Book of the Law” as a “pious fraud”, and the need biblical scholars still feel to deny it nearly two centuries later—the same scholars, I should add, who otherwise agree with de Wette’s identification of the “discovered book” with Deuteronomy.  

Now the really curious thing is that, so far as I have been able to determine, neither de Wette nor for that matter anyone else in the

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3 Among many examples, see Noth (1960: 275-276): “In all probability, this ‘Book of the Law’ was identical with the original form of the deuteronomist law which is preserved in the Old Testament. It was presumably compiled in the course of the 7th century B.C. and was based on various older collections of laws…, the intention of the compilation being to reformulate the *ancient divine law* for the present age… We do not know exactly in what circles in the 7th century this ‘Book of the Law’ was written on the basis of *ancient tradition*; nor do we know how it came to the temple in Jerusalem and remained unnoticed to begin with. …The formerly widely accepted idea, that the alleged discovery was simply a ‘pious deception’ staged by the Jerusalem priests, is hardly tenable” [emphasis added]; Bright (1981: 321): “This was no new law, still less the ‘pious fraud’ it has sometimes been called, but rather a homiletic collection of *ancient laws* that derived ultimately from the legal tradition of *earliest Israel*” [emphasis added]; and Herrmann (1981: 267, 272): “Questions have long been asked about the real content of the ‘book,’ where it came from and why it was ‘found’. After all, it came to light in a most mysterious way, and was acted upon with surprising rapidity. The ‘discovery’ in the temple itself raised a great many questions and was given as many answers. We cannot go into them here. … *There was certainly no question of a priestly fraud*” [emphasis added]. I know of only one biblical scholar who has called the discovery of the “Book of the Law” a forgery tout court. Morton Smith (1972: 208) declares: “…the Deuteronomistic code was the most influential forgery in the history of the world.” Smith is the exception that proves the rule that biblical scholars must never apply the word “forgery” or “fraction” to *canonical* texts, but must always employ euphemisms such as “pseudepigraphy” or “pseudonymity”. Friedrich Delitzsch relates an amusing story about his first encounter with this scholarly sleight of hand. During his student days he learned from his professor that Deuteronomy was not written by Moses, but was a work of the seventh century, composed for a specific purpose, and for that purpose attributed to Moses. Disturbed by this, he went to call on his professor and, in the course of their conversation, asked, “Is Deuteronomy, then, a forgery?” “For God’s sake, no!” said the professor. “That may well be so, but you mustn’t say so” (Delitzsch 1920-1921: 1.5; in Smith 1972: 193). More on this attitude below.
nineteenth century ever described the discovery of the "Book of the Law" as a "fraud"—pious or otherwise. The allegation quoted above, that "de Wette referred to [Deuteronomy] as a 'pious fraud'" (Friedman 1987: 102), stands without citation, although de Wette's dissertation is included in the bibliography (Friedman 1987: 283). I have not made a comprehensive survey of de Wette's voluminous writings (his books alone number more than forty), but I can say definitively that neither in the famous Dissertatio of 1805 nor in the influential Beiträge of 1806-1807 can the expressions pia fraus or frommer Betrug be found in reference to the discovery of the "Book of the Law". Rudolf Smend, one of de Wette's biographers, would seem to confirm this when he wrote the following about de Wette's discussion of the discovery of the mysterious Gesetzbuch: "The related question regarding the discovery (Auffindung), namely, the later, much discussed possibility of a 'priestly fraud' (Priesterbetrug), de Wette left open" (1957: 47). Nor is there any reference to de Wette's use of the expression "pious fraud" in the biography by John W. Rogerson (1992). In fact, who first labeled the discovery of the "Book of the Law" a "pious fraud" or "Priesterbetrug" remains something of a mystery itself.4

4 De Wette described the connection of the Passover festival with the Exodus from Egypt as "eine fremme Dichtung" (1806-1807: 1.295; cf. 1.292: "spätere Fiktion"; 1.293: "nichts als Mythe"), but this is a far cry from a charge of "Betrug", and in any case is not a reference to the discovery of the "Book of the Law" in 2 Kings 22. When I inquired of Professor Smend whether he knew of any reference to "pious fraud" in de Wette's writings, he replied: "Ich weiß auch keinen Beleg für 'pious fraud' bei W.M.L. de Wette und glaube auch kaum, daß es ihn gibt" (personal communication, June 18, 2002).

De Wette insisted that although the historical reliability of the Bible might appear to have lost as a result of his research, "religion" had actually benefited: "Die Geschichte verlor, aber die Religion gewann!" he declared on the final page of the Beiträge (1806-1807: 2.408). For de Wette, history was of only limited value; poetry and myth were much more important. Jakob Friedrich Fries, a Kantian philosopher, and the theologian Friedrich Schleiermacher were major influences on de Wette. Rogerson provides a convenient summary of his project: "[... De Wette] posited an intuitive way of knowing in religion, analogous to that faculty of the mind whereby one coordinated sense impressions and ordered the world according to its 'laws'. In the religious sphere, this way of knowing coordinated the experience and knowledge which a man gained during his lifetime not according to logical principles, but in such a way that the problems and contradictions of life were resolved into an understanding which transcended the perspective of this world. However, it was a necessary characteristic of this way of knowing that it should express itself in mythical or symbolic ways, and thus myth was an inescapable part of religious experience and expression" (Rogerson 1974: 19-20). You can perhaps anticipate where this is headed: "In the Über Religion und Theologie' [1815] de Wette ... sketched not only the history of Israel's religion, but the history of Christianity, in order to show the relevance of the former to the latter. His starting point was the Mosaic religion as
My search through early nineteenth-century biblical scholarship has come up empty on this score: “fraud” does not seem to have been part of the vocabulary of even the most radical critics, such as Wilhelm Vatke or Peter von Bohlen. Vatke doubted whether the “Book of the Law” was really “found” in the temple. In light of the consequences that its discovery had for the idolatrous priests of the temple, its concealment there would have been a dangerous affair. His view of the law book was that it contained chapters 13, 19-24, and 32-34 of Exodus, and was not to be identified with Deuteronomy, which he thought was a post-exilic composition (1835: 504-509). Yet, for all this, he never advanced a charge of “fraud”. Von Bohlen followed de Wette in identifying the “Book of the Law” with Deuteronomy, and, after a comparison of its language with that of Jeremiah, concluded that Deuteronomy had been recently composed (i.e., in the seventh century). Moreover, he considered it the earliest part of the Pentateuch. Its “discovery” was part of “an arrangement (eine Verabredung) ... of theocratic patriots” to revive the national consciousness in the face of Judah’s enemies (1835: clxiv). While this may have involved “possible deception” (etwaige Täuschung) on the part of the priests, this must be understood in light of the particular historical circumstances of the late seventh century (1835: clxiv). “The discovery of the Book of the Law appears ... to have been designed to invigorate the nation by a new constitution, to unite the people more closely together, and to call forth a spirit of independence.” So, von

reconstructed by himself, that is, lacking the legal and cultic aspects. ... The Mosaic faith was essentially simple and direct, with an appropriately spontaneous mythology. The prophets continued the true spirit of the Mosaic religion. However, the rise of cultic and legalistic religion [the discovery of Deuteronomy is crucial in this], the influx of an alien mythology from Persia after the Exile, and finally the emergence of later Judaism, had led to the reflective, non-spontaneous type of religion so harmful to a proper mythology. In the New Testament era, Jesus had returned to the religion of Moses and the prophets, not least by abolishing the law, the temple, and its cultic requirements. However, in the course of time, the Roman Catholic Church had almost reverted to Judaism, and had thereby created a mythology which bordered on superstition. The Reformation had freed the Church from these excesses, and returned to the spontaneous faith which ultimately went back to Moses. ... Thus de Wette tried to save the Old Testament and its mythology from becoming merely an interesting historical relic, by asserting the unity of religious experience between the religion of the Old Testament and [Protestant] Christianity” (Rogerson 1974: 20-21). Simply put, the religion of the Old Testament and of Protestant Christianity is spontaneous and good; the religion of Judaism and Roman Catholicism is reflective and bad. So construed, the discovery of the “Book of the Law” (Deuteronomy) was for de Wette the first step on the road to Judaism/Roman Catholicism.
Bohlen cautioned, “one ought to refrain from speaking of a fraud” (Betruge; 1835: clxvi).

If radicals such as Vatke and von Bohlen refused to label the discovery of the “Book of the Law” a “fraud”, what critics may we expect to find who used this kind of language? At least one scholar alleges that “Wellhausen seems to have held this view” (Nicholson 1967: 16 n. 2, referring to Wellhausen 1885: 25-26), but I have not found anything in the Prolegomena to warrant such a claim. Wellhausen (1885: 39, 45) referred in passing to the wilderness tabernacle of the Priestly Code as an “historical fiction”, but there is no mention of “fraud” in relation to the discovery of the “Book of the Law” or to Deuteronomy (see e.g. Wellhausen 1885: 26-27, 33-34, and esp. 402-410). In fact, I have not been able to find any such charge leveled by the giants of nineteenth-century biblical criticism mentioned earlier. There is no accusation of “Betrug” in Karl Heinrich Graf’s analysis of the discovery of the “Book of the Law” (Deuteronomy), although he dated its composition in the reign of Josiah (1866: 4-6). Graf’s late dating (621 B.C.E.) was accepted by the Dutch scholar, Abraham Kuenen, who described Deuteronomy as a “literary fiction” (letter-kundige fictie), arguing that its discovery “[could] not reasonably be ascribed to chance” (1885-1893: 1.213-215). This might appear to have involved “deception” (bedrog) on the part of the reforming party, but Kuenen cautioned that

the ideas of those days were not the same as ours, but considerably less strict. … Nor must we forget that at all times and in all countries faction and internal quarrels have stifled delicacy in the choice of means. And finally we must not overlook the fact that the victory of the Mosaic party, although gained by cunning (slinksche wegen), must not be attributed to the stratagem of which they made use, but to the good cause which they upheld, and to the weapons with which they defended it. (1869-70: 1.427-428)

The surprisingly cautious and exculpatory language of these nineteenth-century critics seems altogether insufficient to explain the persistent and adamant denial of “fraud” on the part of their conservative opponents.

The earliest reference to “pious fraud” that I have found is in a book published anonymously in 1847. The writer was Francis William Newman, younger brother of John Henry Newman, and the book was entitled A History of the Hebrew Monarchy from the Administration of Samuel to the Babylonish Captivity. Newman treated the Old Testa-
ment “like any other book” and set forth a radical view of Israelite history. His analysis of the discovery of the “Book of the Law” is presented in devastating fashion. Newman argued that the “Book of the Law”, upon which Josiah’s reforms were based, was not Deuteronomy only, but the other books of the Pentateuch as well, which now received their final form and first public recognition. Although it was clear that Deuteronomy was of recent (seventh-century) origin, Newman is careful not to accuse Hilkiah and the priests of that time of fraud (1847: 317-318):

The arguments which avail to show the recent origin of Deuteronomy, forbid us to imagine that the sacerdotal party of that day, however well-intentioned, could feel any such hesitations and scruples, as would affect even the commonest minds among ourselves, in compiling from mixed sources an authoritative and sacred book. When we know what a Cyprian or a Chrysostom thought of ‘pious frauds’, and how greedily a Justin Martyr could snatch at Sibylline forgeries which helped a Christian advocate, it would be vain to expect our own standard of simplicity in an Hilkiah.

Although the possibility of “pious fraud” is here raised, Newman’s conclusions excuse more than they condemn.

However, Newman’s language becomes less circumspect and much more direct in the third edition of his Hebrew Monarchy: “To allege a discovery is to confess an invention”, he contends (1865: 309).

Whether there was, or was not, imposture in these transactions, is a question, on which there are, and will be, differences of opinion, even among those who are alike convinced that the Pentateuch in its modern form is later than Hezekiah. ... At the same time, I confess, I cannot myself shake off the belief that here, as in so many other instances [a footnote refers to the Book of Mormon], the enthusiasm of many was assisted and heightened by the fraud of a few; and though no one can say who were the fraudulent, Hilkiah and Shaphan seem the names most open to the charge. (1865: 315)

This is as close to a charge of “fraud” as I have been able to find, and it occurs in the work of a scholar who is now almost forgotten.

Given the difficulty of finding references to the use of “pious fraud” in the nineteenth century, it is surprising to come across the following in an article on the “Hexateuch”, published in Hastings’ Dictionary of the Bible at the close of the century: “The majority of critics believe this book of the law to have been the result of a pious
fraud promulgated by Hilkiah and Shaphan with the intention of deceiving Josiah into the belief that the reforms which they desired were the express command of God revealed to Moses" (Woods 1899: 368). Although the author claims that this is the view of "the majority of critics", no references are offered. In the article on "Deuteronomy" in the same Dictionary, readers are assured that "there is no foundation for the suggestion ... that the story of its [Deuteronomy's] finding was a fabrication" (Ryle 1899: 602). Again, no references.

My survey of scholarship on this topic is admittedly incomplete, but the results would seem to suggest that biblical scholars protest too much: the denial of fraud in reference to the discovery of the "Book of the Law" is inversely proportional to the actual occurrence of the charge. It would appear, moreover, that it is mainly conservative scholars who invoke the label—and then deny it—as a way of discrediting the radical criticism of their opponents. Yet they do so in a fashion that can only be described as disingenuous. By alleging that their opponents dismiss the discovery of the "Book of the Law" as a "fraud"—when they do not—conservative scholars introduce an incendiary term into the debate designed to discredit a criticism of the Bible that would ostensibly seek to explain human things in human terms. Put differently, it is conservative scholars who are in fact leveling a charge of "fraud" against a criticism that refuses to treat the Bible "as the Bible"—that is, refuses to ratify their claims to its sacrosanct status. Friedman's attack on de Wette is only a more recent example of what has been a very long struggle, not only to defend the integrity and authority of the Bible, but also to broker that authority undiminished. (With what interests and to what ends, are questions to which we shall return.)

I confess to being less interested in who first labeled the discovery of the "Book of the Law" a "pious fraud" than I am in the discomfort critical inquiry still causes many biblical scholars. This discomfort finds expression not only in the repeated denial of "fraud", as with the scholars already mentioned. Just as common is a tactic of obliquity that merely paraphrases and leaves the narrative of "discovery" uninterrogated and intact. Consider, for example, what one of the current leading authorities on the book of Deuteronomy has to say about the discovery of the "Book of the Law": "The discovery of ancient sacred documents in a temple was always a thrilling event" (Weinfeld 1992: 175). ("Thrilling" for whom, we may ask? It is worth pointing out that Hilkiah displays no amazement at the discovery of
the “Book of the Law”. By contrast, the “idolatrous” priests slaughtered by Josiah were probably less than thrilled with its discovery.) Citing a lone Hittite example, which our scholar takes as an historical instance of another such discovery, and “a very instructive comparison with Hebrew traditions”, he then concludes that “just as Josiah …, when he rediscovers the ancient law, promises to fulfill it and asks for forgiveness for the violations of the covenant written in the rediscovered book (2 Kgs 22:13), so also does [the Hittite king]” (Weinfeld 1992: 175, emphasis added). In this way, the antiquity and authenticity of the books in question are maintained, as well as the veracity of the discovery tales, without even having to address the question of “fraud”, “forgery”, “fabrication”, and the like.

Sensitivity to the problem of “fraud”—pious or otherwise—is not just a feature of the discourse of biblical studies; the term seems to be deliberately avoided in the contemporary field of religious studies as well. You may not be surprised to learn that there is no entry under “fraud” in Hastings’ Dictionary of the Bible, The Interpreter’s Dictionary of the Bible, or The Anchor Bible Dictionary (Freedman 1992), but you may be surprised to discover that the term does not appear in The Encyclopedia of Religion (Eliade 1987) or in Critical Terms for Religious Studies (Taylor 1998). It cannot be found even among the 3,200 articles in The HarperCollins Dictionary of Religion (Smith 1995). The absence of “fraud” from the disciplinary lexica is more than a little curious, especially since “fraud” is very much a part of religion’s vocabulary, and, from a cynical view of religion’s history, “fraud” might very well be regarded as the modus operandi religiosus. Among the many examples which could be cited, just consider the rich mythologies surrounding the phenomenon of the “holy book” in Western religious history, and in particular the extraordinary claims about books not only “miraculously discovered”, but also “divinely dictated”, “prophetically inspired”, and so on. The discovery of the “Book of the Law” was not the first time a document had been found in a temple, and it certainly would not be the last time.

A brief history of “discovered books”

Claims about the “discovery” (or, more precisely, the “rediscovery”) of an ancient document are surprisingly common in Mediterranean antiquity (Speyer 1970; Smith 1983: 85-97; Grafton 1990; Ahlström
1993: 773). At times the discovery of an archaic text formed part of an apologetic argument on behalf of a group’s antiquity (and therefore legitimacy); at other times the discovery provided the pretext for some innovation in relation to religious practice. “Discovered books” were sometimes claimed to be antediluvian and to contain accounts of creation and primeval history; in other cases they narrated eschatological events rather than archaic ones. For example, the Babylonian History of Berossus (c. 281 B.C.E.) purports to be a paraphrase in Greek of archaic Babylonian materials found in the temple of Bel in Babylon, recording “the histories of heaven and of earth and sea and the first birth and the kings and their deeds” (Burstein 1978: 13). The Gospel of the Egyptians, a Nag Hammadi tractate, claims to have been written and hidden by Seth, “in order that at the end of times … it may come forth and reveal this incorruptible, holy race of the great savior, and those who dwell with them in love” (68.14-23; Robinson 1988: 218). There is, however, one kind of discovery tale of direct relevance to the “Book of the Law” in 2 Kings 22, and that is the discovery of an ancient book in historical time. Let me take just a few examples for consideration and comparison.

The so-called “Memphite Theology” is the name given to an inscription dating to the reign of King Shabaka of the Twenty-Fifth Egyptian Dynasty (c. 710 B.C.E.). The introduction of the text claims that it was a copy of a much earlier document, written on papyrus or leather, which had been partially destroyed. Because of its importance, the king has ordered that it be restored and inscribed on stone.

This writing was copied out anew by his majesty [Shabaka] in the House of his father Ptah-South-of-his-Wall, for his majesty had found it to be a work of the ancestors which was worm-eaten, so that it could not be understood from beginning to end. His majesty copied it anew, so that it became better than it had been before, in order that his name might endure and his monument last in the House of his father Ptah-South-of-the-Wall throughout eternity, as a work done by the Son of Re [Shabaka] for his father Ptah-Tatenen, so that he might live forever. (“The Memphite Theology” 2; Lichtheim 1971-80: 1.52)

The “original” document follows this introduction, in archaic language resembling that of the so-called Pyramid Texts of the Old Kingdom (c. 2500 B.C.E.). About two-thirds of the inscription has been destroyed, but it treats consecutively three interrelated topics: (1) Ptah is the king of Egypt and the unifier of the land; (2) Memphis is the capital of Egypt and the hinge of Upper and Lower Egypt; and
(3) Ptah is also the supreme god and creator of the world. The introductory claim, along with the strongly archaizing language of the text, initially led generations of Egyptologists to assign the “original” composition to the Old Kingdom, when the First Dynasty achieved the unification of Upper and Lower Egypt, and established its new capital at Memphis. A new theology had to be constructed which reflected this centralization, and this is precisely what the “Memphite Theology” was intended to achieve: Ptah, the god of Memphis and “father” of the king, now outranks all the other (local) gods of Egypt, who are construed as manifestations (or hypostatizations) of Ptah. In 1973, however, the veracity of the inscription’s introduction was challenged by Friedrich Junge (1973: 195-205), and his analysis now makes it appear certain that the so-called “original” was actually a piece of political propaganda deliberately written in archaizing language in the Twenty-Fifth Dynasty (i.e., in the reign of Shabaka, its founder), in order to broker the authority of the past for the benefit of the present—that is, for the benefit of Shabaka. For it was the rulers of the Twenty-Fifth Dynasty who claimed to “restore” Memphis to its former greatness after a period of decline, and who turned it into their residence. Shabaka’s restoration, like Josiah’s a century later, was legitimated by the “discovery” of an allegedly archaic religious text—in short, by a “pious fraud”.5

The “accidental” discovery in a temple of an ancient writing going back to Egypt’s first dynasties seems to have been a fairly common Egyptian topos. Indeed, there are reasons to think that this topos may have even served as a model for the discovery tale in 2 Kings 22 (Herrmann 1908: 298-302). An anatomical treatise dating from the Eighteenth Dynasty (sixteenth century B.C.E.), carries the claim that it was “found in writing under the feet of Anubis in Letopolis. It was brought to the king of Upper and Lower Egypt: Usaphais, the triumphant” (a king of the First Dynasty; Pritchard 1969: 495). The phrase “under the feet of Anubis” puts the “original” document in the direct authority of this deity, and its “sudden” discovery may have served to confirm its divine origin. Similarly, a medical treatise of the Twenty-First Dynasty (eleventh/tenth century B.C.E.) contains the miraculous claim that “this remedy was found in the night, fallen into the

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5 Lichtheim (1971-80: 3.5) now advises readers of her anthology to transfer the “Memphite Theology” (or “Shabaka Stone”) from Volume I (Old and Middle Kingdoms) to Volume III (The Late Period).
court of the temple in Koptos, as a mystery of the goddess [Isis], by the lector-priest of this temple .... It was brought as a marvel to the majesty of the king of Upper and Lower Egypt: Khufu, the triumphant” (a king of the Fourth Dynasty; Pritchard 1969: 495). The analogous claim in Egyptian literature of various genres—“It has come successfully to its end, from its beginning to its end, like that which was found in writing”—is likewise an attempt to assert the fidelity of the present copy to its “ancient” exemplar (Pritchard 1965: 22, 414, 418). This assertion of faithfulness to an earlier source is strikingly similar to the repeated claim of the “Deuteronomic History” to be based upon archival documents, such as the “Book of the Annals of the Kings of Judah/Israel” (1 Kings 14:29; 15:31; 16:5; etc.), or the “Book of the Acts of Solomon” (1 Kings 11:41).

At the end of the Pharoanic period (fourth/third century B.C.E.) the priests of a temple at Karnak wished to promote their god’s reputation as a healer and their own reputations as physicians. So they composed a narrative of their god’s success as a healer, cast the story back into the time of Ramses II (thirteenth century B.C.E.), and installed the inscription in their temple. The modern translator of the text calls it—without hesitation or qualification—“a pious forgery” (John A. Wilson, in Pritchard 1965: 29). An even later text, perhaps from the end of the second century B.C.E. (i.e., the Ptolemaic period), contains a story of the “Seven Lean Years” in Egypt set back in the reign of Djoser of the Third Dynasty (twenty-eighth century B.C.E.). Among other things, the narrative recounts the reasons why a stretch of Nile land south of Elephantine had been devoted to Khnum, the god of Elephantine. Again, in the words of the translator, it is in all likelihood “a priestly forgery of some late period, justifying their [the priests’] claim to territorial privileges” (John A. Wilson, in Pritchard 1965: 31). The ease with which an Egyptologist can describe these texts as “priestly” or “pious forgeries”—that is, his refusal to ratify the claims of these texts—stands in sharp contrast not only to the biblical scholar’s reticence to employ such designations, but also to his concern to defend biblical texts against the charge of “fraud”. Not all “discovered” texts, it would appear, are treated with the same suspicion.

We do not know what sort of risks were involved in fabricating texts like this, nor do we know how successful these texts were in achieving their forgers’ aims. Roman tradition supplies a classic instance of a discovered book—the so-called “Books of Numa”—but in
this case we encounter a failed attempt to pass off a set of fraudulent texts as authentic (Smith 1983: 89-90). In the official Roman tradition, largely represented by the first book of Livy's *History*, Numa is the legendary second king of Rome (traditionally 715-673 B.C.E.), a pious pacifist in contrast to his bellicose predecessor, Romulus. As with Moses in biblical tradition, the basic framework of Roman public religion was traced back to Numa, including cults, rituals, priesthoods, and the calendar.\(^6\) In the legends that developed around him in the fourth and third centuries B.C.E., Numa is alleged by some to have studied with Pythagoras, notwithstanding the impossibility of this from a chronological point of view.\(^7\) But this connection was rejected by Livy, not so much on chronological grounds as patriotic ones: "Numa's noble qualities were all his own; it was not foreign learning that made him what he was, but the harsh, austere discipline of the ancient Sabines" (Livy 1.18.2; cf. Cicero, *Republic* 2.28-29). In 181 B.C.E. a set of scrolls purporting to be the lost books of Numa was "discovered". There are two main—and divergent—accounts (Livy 40.29.3-14; Plutarch, *Numa* 22.4-5; cf. Pliny, *Natural History* 13.27.84-89), but the gist of the narrative is as follows: Below the Janiculum, a prominent ridge on the west bank of the Tiber at Rome, there was an "accidental discovery" of two stone coffins on the land of Lucius Petilius, a public clerk. One coffin, according to its label, contained the body of Numa; the other, his writings. According to Livy, the sarcophagi were discovered by ploughmen; according to Plutarch, after a violent rainstorm had washed away the covering earth. Upon opening the coffins, the first was found to be empty, with no sign of it ever having held a body. The second coffin contained two packages of books, tied with string and coated with pitch. Not only were the books intact, they appeared to be "surprisingly new". There were either fourteen or twenty-four books: a set of seven (or twelve) in Greek on philosophy, and an equal number in Latin on religious rituals. Initially, the books seem to have circulated only

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\(^6\) Yet, in striking contrast to the biblical reports of Moses, Livy is quite willing to discard the veracity of the stories of Numa's miraculous encounters with various (Greek) deities as the source of his divine legislation, in order to focus on the fabricated character of Numa's religion as an effective political instrument in keeping a largely ignorant populace in check (see esp. Livy, *History of Rome* 1.19.4-5; and Hooker 1963: 87-132).

\(^7\) For Numa's alleged association with Pythagoras, see Livy 1.18.2; 40.29.8; Ovid, *Metamorphoses* 15.60-496; and Plutarch, *Numa* 1.1-3; 22.4.
among a small group of “friends” (viz., those persons connected with the “discovery”), but when news of them reached the authorities, the books were confiscated and brought before the Roman Senate. That body declared them “unfit to be read or to be preserved” because they were subversive and “destructive of religion”. They were therefore ordered to be publicly burned.8 The ancient sources offer two explanations for these forgeries: they were either an attempt by the forger to make money by “discovering” books of spurious antiquity; or they were part of a Pythagorean plot. Certainty in this matter is beyond our reach, but the latter explanation seems to fit the context better, both in terms of the political situation of Rome in the early second century B.C.E. and the political interests of the Pythagoreans. In any case, there was certainly no shortage of Pythagorean books forged in the Hellenistic period (Thesleff 1961).

The Egyptian and Roman examples would seem to point to a set of motifs common to these discovery narratives. The tale could be told in a variety of ways, but there seem to be four central elements: (1) a book (or books or part of a book) is discovered suddenly and accidentally, (2) in a sacred place, (3) by a person connected with the king or by the king himself, and (4) the book is validated (or, in the case of Numa, not validated) by an official action (Smith 1983: 90). The account of the discovery of the “Book of the Law” in the temple in Jerusalem during the reign of Josiah is only a more fulsome example of this master narrative, and may well have been modeled on it. But it should be remembered that this is only one of many different scenarios in which texts were invested with authority in Mediterranean antiquity. The discussion could be extended to consider books written, sent, or dictated by the gods, books descended from heaven, journeys to heaven to read or receive a book, books given through divine inspiration, and so on. I have limited the analysis to just one of these scenarios— “discovered books”—but the problem of “fraud” seems to me to be raised by all of these cases. Now my question is this: How is it that, within the history of “discovered books” (and, I would contend, the history of religions generally), “fraud” can be a

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8 This was the same Senate that regularly “discovered” prophecies among the Sibylline books as a political instrument of foreign and domestic policy. For example, near the close of the second Punic War (c. 205/04 B.C.E.), and in order to cement an alliance with the kingdom of Pergamum, a Sibylline prophecy was “discovered” that gave instructions for the cult of the Magna Mater to be brought to Rome (see Livy 29.10-14).
means of legitimation under one set of circumstances and an alto-
gether illegitimate act under another? This question, it seems to me,
is rarely acknowledged, and much less answered, by biblical scholars
or scholars of religion. Witness the silence of their disciplines’ lexica.

_Literary forgeries or canonical pseudepigrapha?

The label “pious fraud” makes its appearance in biblical studies, as
we have seen, almost always in the form of a denial, a rhetorical
“prolepsis”: a preemptive strike in argument by raising an objection
beforehand in order to dispose of it. But in some cases the label is
actually invoked for descriptive purposes, though still with a view to
damage control. That is, for some scholars the emphasis can be
placed on the adjective “pious”, so that a charge of outright forgery
is neutralized with respect to certain holy books (viz., the ones that are
thought to count). For example, Plato’s “noble lie” (_gennaion speudos,
Republic_ 414bc) is sometimes offered as an explanatory (read: exculpa-
tory) analogy for the many so-called “pseudepigraphical” texts in the
biblical canon. So a prominent New Testament scholar argued in his
presidential address to the Society of Biblical Literature: “Plato’s doc-
trine of the ‘noble falsehood’ pervaded Greek speculation and passed
by inheritance to hellenistic culture in general. Thus it is not surpris-
ing that the assumption underlying the attitude of many was that the
mere formal accuracy of a statement was of infinitely less importance
than the religious or moral value of its content” (Metzger 1972: 19;
the title of this address declares its thesis: “Literary forgeries and
canonical pseudepigrapha”).

Now, I know of no evidence that would support such an assertion
(or distinction). That is, so far as I know, no one in antiquity said of
any putatively historical work, “This is a forgery but legitimate nev-
evertheless” (see Baum 2001: 165-177, 194-195). The rhetorical figure
of _catachresis_ (“misuse”)—a strained or mixed metaphor—seems to me
the best way to understand this use of the label “pious fraud” or
“canonical pseudepigrapha”. Each is a figural “straining” that both
acknowledges and disavows its reference. Each functions rather like a
decoy, a misapplication of terms that stands in for a necessary detour
of thought or questioning. Neither in its proleptic nor catachretic
uses, however, can it be said that “pious fraud” or “canonical pseud-
epigrapha” are categories possessed of any explanatory utility. Rather
than providing an answer, they are rhetorical attempts either to pre-empt the objection of “fraud” or to mask and misname it. In the face of the discipline’s considerable investment in maintaining these strategies, I would argue for their recognition and dismantling, in order that their reference—“fraud”—may be differently construed. But more on this in a moment.

Wolfgang Speyer, the leading expert on forgery in Mediterranean antiquity (1971; 1977; cf. Bickerman 1973), has introduced the curious concept of “authentic religious pseudepigraphy” (“echte religiöse Pseudepigraphie”) to distinguish a particular kind of fabrication from outright “forgery” (“gefalschte religiöse Pseudepigraphie” or simply “Fälschung”). “Authentic religious pseudepigraphy”, according to Speyer, was widespread in the ancient Near East as well as in Greece and Rome, emerged from mythological origins, and represented a deity, angel, or other mythological personage as the author. But Speyer also recognizes the production of what he calls “literary forgery” (“literarische Fälschung”), which he contends originated in imitation of “authentic religious pseudepigraphy”. By what criterion is one distinguished from the other? Speyer argues that the sine qua non is neither literary, religious, nor ethical; rather it is psychological: to wit, whether the author believed that he had acted as the agent of his god or, for whatever reasons, simply wanted to deceive: “Zur Fälschung gehört die Täuschungsabsicht . . . [Die echte religiöse Pseudepigraphie] entsteht gleichsam unter einem Zwang aus transcendentem Bereich. Der Autor muß sprechen wie die Apokalyptiker oder die Sibylle Heraklits. Die Fälschung hingegen ist ganz vom menschlichen Willen abhängig wie, um ein Beispiel zu nennen, die aus politischen Absichten gefälschten Orakel” (Speyer 1977: 246). But what does this criterion yield if it is applied to the discovery of the “Book of the Law”, the “Memphite Theology”, or the “Books of Numa”? In none of these cases is it possible to recover the psychological state of the “authors”, much less can one discern the “compulsion of a transcendent realm”. Yet, in all three cases their “human designs” and “political intentions” are only too clear. It is precisely by playing the “transcendent” (read: legitimate) off against the “political” (read: illegitimate) that puts Speyer in the position to preserve certain texts from the charge of “Fälschung”. The transcendent qua transcendent is

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9 Among the early Christians, according to Speyer, it was the “heretics” who began the production of “forged religious pseudepigrapha”, which in turn required that some “orthodox” writers had to adopt pseudepigraphy as a necessary contrivance in their battle with the heretics (1977: 247-262).
above politics; it is beyond human intentions and interests; it is, finally, impervious to and immune from historical scrutiny and explanation.¹⁰

Let us consider once more the discovery of the “Book of the Law”, but let us do so without appealing either to psychology or to the transcendent. Instead, to the extent that the sources—both literary and material—allow, let us focus relentlessly on the temporal, situated, interested, human, and—in a word—political dimensions of the “discovery”.¹¹

The politics of “discovered books”

The sudden appearance in 621 B.C.E. of the “Book of the Law” occurred just four years after the death of Ashurbanipal and in the midst of the rapid disintegration of the Assyrian empire, which was not only the dominant superpower in the region, but, more to the point, the overlord of the little temple-state of Judah.¹² In what must have seemed like a miracle in Judahite eyes, a century of Assyrian domination had finally come to an end. The kingdom of Egypt was on the move under Psammetichus I (664-610 B.C.E., founder of the Twenty-Sixth Dynasty), but he was interested mainly in controlling the rich agricultural lands and international trade routes along the coastal regions of Palestine. The time seemed ripe for the expansionist political ambitions of Judah and the creation of a pan-Palestinian state with its capital at Jerusalem. The Josianic risorgimento, of which the discovery of the “Book of the Law” was the pretext, was not just a purification of the cult of Yahweh; the removal and desecration of the Assyrian sacred objects from the temple in Jerusalem was a declaration of independence from Assyrian domination. But the discov-

¹⁰ This strategy of juxtaposing the “transcendent” and the “political” is not unique to Speyer; it is a familiar ploy in the study of religion. To take a timely example, it is just this contrast between “ein Zusammentragen der Bereiche” and “politisiche Ab- sichten” that allows pundits, politicians, and scholars—including scholars of religion—to distinguish between legitimate and illegitimate forms of Islam. Isn’t the recent terminology “political Islam” tantamount to a charge of “fraud”?

¹¹ For the sake of my argument here I am willing to grant (1) that the account in 2 Kings 22-23 is more or less historically reliable, and (2) that “Book of the Law” was an earlier version of the book of Deuteronomy. In another context, however, I should want to challenge both of these claims.

¹² For the international scene in the last decades of the seventh century B.C.E., see Malamat (1984: 117-129).
ery of the book and the reforms it spawned marked the beginning of a political and literary process rather than an end. The political aspirations of a resurgent Judah required powerful propaganda to unite the subjects of the kingdom for the struggle that lay ahead. So it was that on the heels of the discovery of the “Book of the Law” came the forging of an entire national myth for late seventh-century Judah: a little temple-state with big plans required a grand story, nothing less than a radical recasting of collective identity. In constructing this myth, the ideologues of the royal chancellery were not operating in a vacuum. Their myth-making would require the de-mystifying, delegitimating, and deconstructing of previously established norms, institutions, and discourses.

Like all myths, the new one was not created ex nihilo; it was forged from many diverse and conflicting traditions. It began with the ancestors, the “Patriarchs”, and continued with the sojourn and bondage to Egypt, the exodus and wandering in the wilderness, concluding with the tribes poised to enter Canaan, the land promised to them by their god. This mythic history continued with the violent conquest of Canaan, the slaughter of its indigenous inhabitants, the establishment of a united monarchy under David, the division of the monarchy, and the eventual destruction of the northern kingdom (“Israel”) by the Assyrians. Finally, the myth predicted the arrival of a “messiah”, a “righteous king”, and reached its climax with the ascendancy of Josiah, the scion of David, who would deliver a new golden age. This, in sum, was the story told by the myth-makers of the so-called “Deuteronomic History”, and, until very recently, this was also the myth that almost all biblical scholars ratified and repeated as the history of ancient Israel. I am referring to the historical reconstructions of the prevailing “Noth-Albright-Bright school of Old Testament studies” (Zwelling 2000: 117 n. 1).

There are now good reasons to think that the vast majority of this myth is sheer ideology, a “pious fraud”, if you like. The recent and still highly controversial work of scholars such as Philip R. Davies (1992), Israel Finkelstein (2000), Giovanni Garbini (1988), Niels Peter Lemche (1988), Thomas L. Thompson (1999), John Van Seters (1983), and Keith W. Whitelam (1996) is beginning to yield the following conclusions: (1) the quest of the historical “patriarchs” has failed; (2) the “exodus” did not occur; (3) the violent, swift, and total conquest of Canaan never took place; (4) David and Solomon were little more than “hill country chieftains”; (5) there was no golden age
of a united kingdom, a magnificent capital, and an extended empire. Yet, these conclusions need not lead either to cynicism or to a charge of "fraud". On the contrary, for the first time they open up a particular foundation myth—a myth still acutely central to the West’s imagination of itself at this historical moment—to an alternative construal. We can now see the Josianic ideologues at work, bringing together in their national myth the Judean patriarch Abraham and the Israelite patriarch Jacob, to serve the political interests of the royal court for a unified kingdom. The pastoral landscapes of these stories resonated with a large portion of the Judahite population, the "people of land", whom Josiah tried to enlist on his side and whose interests he claimed to promote. The traditions of an exodus from Egypt also served these political interests. Josiah’s efforts to establish an independent Judean state, and to expand his territorial interests into northern Palestine under the aegis of "reclaiming" the northern kingdom of Israel brought him directly into conflict with the revival of Egyptian power. Moses’ opposition to an unnamed pharaoh in the national epic mirrored Josiah’s challenge to Pharaoh Necho II, the successor to Psammetichus I. So, too, the narrative of conquest. As Joshua before him, Josiah fought in the name of Yahweh. His political and military agenda was a “second” conquest of Canaan, but this time he aimed to finish the job by carrying out a complete “ethnic cleansing” of the land. The stories surrounding Kings David and Solomon also reflect Josianic political ideology, with their promises of an eternal dynasty, their claims of divine kingship, a united monarchy, territorial expansion, and the centralization of religion and politics in Jerusalem. Even “monotheism”, so central to Josiah’s reforms (and allegedly “Israel’s” unique contribution to Western religion), can now be seen as a by-product of imperial political strategy, and not without parallels in the surrounding cultures of the ancient Near East.

But history gave the lie to this national myth. Josiah’s window of opportunity did not remain open for long; indeed, it could last only while the great powers of the Nile and Tigris-Euphrates valleys were too weak to extend their hegemony over Palestine. Riding a wave of nationalist fervor, and convinced that Yahweh would stand by him, Josiah took the heroic (or rash) act of meeting Pharaoh Necho in battle at Megiddo in 609 B.C.E. His bid for “Armageddon” ended in disaster, and his death at the hands of Pharaoh meant the end of his “reforms”. The “people of the land” made one last assertion of independence and, in defiance of Necho, anointed Jehoahaz as their king.
But after only three months, Necho sent Jehoahaz to Egypt in chains, imposed a war indemnity on Judah, and made his older brother Eliakim king, after changing his name to Jehoiakim, as a token of Judah’s subjection to Egypt. The reforms had failed. The ideology of obedience to “Yahweh alone” had not prevented Egypt’s return to enslave Judah. And even Egypt’s defeat a few years later by the Babylonians brought not relief but further devastation. In 587 B.C.E. Jerusalem was sacked and its aristocracy carried off into exile.

Defenders of the Noth-Albright-Bright school have engaged in a furious counter-offensive to deny the legitimacy of this “new history” in an effort to reassert their hegemony over biblical studies. Consider the following remarks by one of the “old history’s” defenders:

[The] “deconstructionists” can safely be ignored by everyone seriously interested in Biblical and Ancient Near Eastern studies. . . . As someone who studies ancient inscriptions in the original, I have a responsibility to warn the lay audience that the new fad, the “deconstructionist school,” represented by Philip R. Davies and his ilk, is merely a circle of dilet-tantes. Their view that nothing in Biblical tradition is earlier than the Persian period, especially their denial of the existence of a United Monarch, is a figment of their vain imagination. . . . Biblical scholarship and instruction should completely ignore the “deconstructionist school.” They have nothing to teach us. (Rainey 1994: 47)

This sounds a little like the Great Oz thundering, “Pay no attention to that man behind the curtain!” In fact, the level of hostility in this piece suggests that the argument is much more than a battle over academic turf. What is at stake, obviously, is the historicity and legitimacy of a canonical collection of religious texts. Less obvious, perhaps, are the contemporary political questions with which biblical scholarship has been and continues to be implicated. “Davies and his ilk”, in particular, have pointed out the ways in which the “search for ancient Israel” has served to advance a Zionist agenda at the expense of suppressing a Palestinian identity. They have argued that the construction of an “ancient Israel” and an “ancient settlement of the land” were inventions of scholars (on the model of the European nation state) by means of an uncritical, paraphrastic use of the Bible which fused academic historicism, on the one hand, with religious/ethnic memory, on the other. The results of this enterprise have contributed both to the occlusion of a Palestinian past and a dispossession of a Palestinian land (Whitelam 1996: 71-121). When the writing of “biblical history” is read in the context of these current,
competing political and religious ideologies, the level of vituperation is not at all surprising. What the so-called “deconstructionist school” has shown us is precisely a case study of “how social formation and ethnic/religious/national affiliation, along with religious practice and belief . . . , attach themselves to a centuries-old tradition of textual inscription and transmission” (Zwelling 2000: 140; for the crucial role archaeology has played in this, see Abu El-Haj 2001).

Is the distinction between what is legitimate and what is illegitimate finally a matter of political success or failure? The answer is patently “yes”, but success and even failure are precarious and never final. Remember that although Josiah’s reforms failed in his own day, they succeeded beyond his wildest dreams in a later age. Not only did the “Book of the Law” and the Josianic national myth (a.k.a. the “Deuteronomic History”) undergo further revisions in the exilic period and later, they eventually found their way into the canonical texts of Judaism and Christianity, becoming as such objects which are taken to be “true” because they are “unmarked”, and “authentic” because they are “above” the political world. Yet, the lengths to which biblical scholars have gone to ratify the claims and even the historicity of these documents suggests that the discipline itself is not as separated from politics as the discipline claims religion (that is, “legitimate” religion) is. I am not suggesting that biblical scholarship is fraudulent; rather, I am arguing that biblical studies, as a modern Western epistemology, deploys legitimating criteria in a selective, interested, and invested manner. Epistemological questions—for example, how knowledge is claimed about Josiah’s “discovery” of the “Book of the Law”, or the reliability of the “Deuteronomic History”—are intimately and persistently at the core of questions of state power and acts of state violence in continuing battles over “Canaan” in our own time.

Conclusion: “Fraud” and the study of religion

Lest there be any misunderstanding, I am certainly not arguing for the introduction of “fraud” as an analytical term in biblical studies, or religious studies generally. But to raise the question of “fraud”—the question of “legitimacy” and “illegitimacy”—is to interrogate the ways in which disciplines themselves, and not just the canons they study, shift and mask the boundaries of what they take to be genuine,
historical, and finally true. In this sense, is not the study of religion—
as a discipline—structured rather like a religion—that is, like the object
it studies? If religion becomes defined by the formal “discovery” of a
text, which is then canonized as “true”, and serves as the pretext for
the purification/elimination of “infidels”, “false beliefs”, “pagan
shrines”, and so on, then does not the discipline itself adopt those
same strategies, those same normative investments in “truth” and
“falsehood”, as its means of performing itself as a discipline—that is,
the formal establishment of “true” texts, “proper” methods for the
production of knowledge, systems of rules, master codes, and pass-
words for access to and control of that knowledge, punishments if
these rules are not properly followed, the elimination of “false” ap-
proaches, and so on? Put simply, does the discipline become a homol-
ogy of the object it studies?13

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13 Remarkably like Hilkiah in 2 Kings 22, Friedman too claims to have “discovered” an ancient, authoritative book. The back cover of The Hidden Book in the Bible (1998) describes the discovery as follows: “Renowned biblical sleuth and scholar Richard Elliott Friedman reveals the first work of prose literature in the world—a 3,000-year-old epic hidden within the books of the Hebrew Bible. Written by a single masterful author but obscured by ancient editors and lost for millennia, this brilliant epic … is a compelling account of humankind’s complex relationship with God. Friedman boldly restores this prose masterpiece—the very heart of the Bible—to the extraordinary form in which it was originally written.” Friedman himself describes the significance of his discovery as follows: “The Bible is more than the sum of its parts. … In its early years, the study of the Bible’s authors was often an attack on the Bible, taking it apart, diminishing it. But we have reached a point at which it is the opposite: we can see the path of how the Bible came to exist. Starting with the work of a great writer, it became greater than all of its writers combined. We may value this work [the now rediscovered hidden book in the Bible] for what it is itself, or we may value it more for being the foundation of the Bible. We may regard it as human or as divinely revealed or inspired. But, in any case, let us treasure it. … Try to visualize the Bible growing from this root [again, the rediscovered book] into a beautiful, multifaceted flower. Then you will understand how the Bible became the Bible—so powerful, so influential, and sacred to so many” (1998: 304). So much for the theology of the project. The political implications of the “discovery” become clear in an appendix where Friedman takes on John Van Seter’s late (i.e., post-exilic) dating of the majority of the Pentateuch. The argument reaches its crescendo in a series of rhetorical questions: “What evidence compels him [Van Seters] to see everything so late? To think that the Jews produced so little of this writing until they
were evicted from their land? To see the centuries in which they flourished in their
land as being so barren of literary-historical production? … To see these late writers
inventing so much of their history?” (Friedmann 1998: 378). These questions make
clear that Friedman’s “discovery” is as much a political act as was Hilkiah’s. By
claiming to “restore” this lost work, Friedman is doing more than defending the
besieged Noth-Albright-Bright school; he is making a historical and political claim
about Palestine.
Legitimacy and illegitimacy require each other. Like the distinctions proper/deviant, history/fiction, canonical/apocryphal, even truth/falsehood, they are conventional, to be understood by their relevance to the sociopolitical context in which they are set forth, debated, and authorized. I would want to argue that to raise the question of “fraud” is also to recognize that there is nothing inherently and automatically “fraudulent”. Rather, we should say that there are instruments and modalities that appear fraudulent within a given sociopolitical taxonomy. So conceived, “fraud” is a social fact, a term applied by an entrenched social order to the instrument by means of which opponents of that order would seek to alter and/or overthrow it. If, in certain circumstances, the use of such an instrument is successful in achieving its ends, then what was once “fraud” may become the “canonical” instrument of a new regime.

To return once more to the case of “discovered books” in Mediterranean antiquity, I would draw attention to the conditions of time and place and milieu in which these fabrications occurred—in short, to the socio-politics of literary production. A book “discovered” in a sacred place seems to have been one of the most potent instruments available—to both dominant and subordinate classes—for bringing about an ideological inversion and a redefinition of society. The advent of literacy (that is to say, the shift from oral modes of authority to documentary) created new possibilities for the construction of authority in the ancient cultures of the Mediterranean, in much the same way as the transition from manuscript to printing would in sixteenth-century Europe, and what the shift from print to digital technology is currently doing in the twenty-first century. This shift not only created new possibilities for constructing authority, it also involved a host of new problems of “authentication”. The sudden discovery of the “Book of the Law”—that is, the appearance of a written text and its public reading by the king—accords well with the evidence for a dramatic increase in literacy in late seventh-century Judah.¹⁴ But because the “Book of the Law” was an innovation, it required some sort of legitimation. A new, emergent religious institution—a written authoritative law—found its legitimation in part through an old one, by being discovered in the temple (Hoppe 1998: 37; see, in

¹⁴ Finkelstein and Silberman (2000: 280-281) point out that “the discovery of hundreds of personal signet seals and seal impressions inscribed in Hebrew from this era attests to the extensive use of writing and written documents. ... [Judah] hardly had the capability of producing extensive biblical texts before.”
general, Bertholet 1949). In other words, the priest’s claim, that “I have found the book of the law in the house of Yahweh” (2 Kings 22:8), would not automatically invalidate a document, as it would tend to for us, living on this side of the printing revolution (compare the persuasive power of: “I have found the lost second page of the Constitution” [1]). On the contrary, such a “discovery”—suddenly and in a sacred place—could potentially serve to invest a document with authority. Even so, as we have seen, the “discovery” itself might not be enough, and the question of a book’s authenticity might also have to be negotiated on other grounds, everything from the use of (or threat of) force, on the one hand, to the symbolic discourses of prophetic validation, ritual performance, spectacle, and so forth, on the other. But, in the end, force—whether coercive or disruptive—is never sufficient, else why would a discovery tale have to be fabricated in the first place? “Ultimately, that which either holds society together or takes it apart is sentiment, and the chief instrument with which sentiment may be aroused, manipulated, and rendered dormant is discourse” (Lincoln 1989: 11). In Mediterranean antiquity, one powerful, emergent mode of discourse was the “discovered book”.

“Pious frauds are frauds, for which one must show no piety—and no pity.” To appreciate this aphorism of Arnaldo Momigliano is to insist on discussing the temporal, situated, interested, and human dimensions of “holy books”, whether they were discovered hidden in a temple or fallen from heaven. Or, to adapt Bruce Lincoln’s Fourth Thesis, the same destabilizing and irreverent questions one might ask of any speech act ought to be put to these “holy books”: “Who speaks here?”, i.e., what person, group, or institution is responsible for a text, whatever its putative or apparent author. Beyond that, “To what audience? In what immediate and broader context? Through what system of mediations? With what interests?” And further, “Of what would the speaker(s) persuade the audience? What are the consequences if this project of persuasion should happen to succeed? Who wins what, and how much? Who, conversely, loses?” (Lincoln 1996: 225). Last, but certainly not least, these same destabilizing and irreverent questions ought to be put to the scholarly discourse about “holy books”—in other words, to the very conditions for disciplinary knowledge, as well as the ways in which that knowledge is regulated through enforced conventions, is reproduced, and produces disciples. Rather like religion, the object it studies, the discipline presents itself
as seamless, progressive, naturally about certain topics. But, like religion, the discipline is not natural; it is historically determined; it emerges out of a heterogeneous landscape as a modern rationalizing taxonomy. To interrogate the discipline is to defamiliarize it, to see it as unnatural, as something forged and fabricated—in a sense, as a "pious fraud".  

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15 This article is a revised version of a paper delivered to the Critical Theory and Discourses on Religion Group at the Annual Meeting of the American Academy of Religion in November 2002. My thanks go to Frank Korom, the panel’s respondent, for his keen observations and stimulating questions. I am especially indebted to Lisa Lowe for her careful reading and incisive criticism of an initial version of this article. I was fortunate to have the superb research assistance of Wendy Kim, who, in addition to her tireless labor on relatively routine matters, provided invaluable suggestions. The fantastic discovery tale with which this article begins owes its inspiration to Paul Kahle. None of them bears any responsibility whatsoever for the tenor of my interpretation or for factual errors.


